Analysis of public-private partnerships for China's water service by Sam Kayaga (1248192) & Lin Zhe (7216988)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Analysis of public–private partnerships for China’s water
service
S. Kayaga MSc, PhD, CEng, MCIWEM and L. Zhe MSc
The private sector in China has been growing since
economic reforms were launched in the late 1970s. The
massive demand for new infrastructure and improved
service levels have precipitated the growth of public–private
partnership (PPPs) in the Chinese water urban sector.
Although the number of water and wastewater
infrastructure projects financed through PPPs had risen to
over 130 by the 2004, with an investment commitment of
over US$4$8 billion, PPPs still accounted for less than 2% of
total investments in the water sector. An institutional
analysis was conducted in 2005 to find out how conducive
PPPs are for provision of water services in Longgang, a
coastal town in the Zhejiang Province of China. Although the
operational performance indicators were generally above
average, subjective assessment of the internal environment
uncovered several gaps, which could be addressed by
adopting an appropriate mode of PPPs. A scan of the
external environment revealed conditions that are largely
conducive to the introduction of PPPs in Longgang Water
Utility. This paper showed how an existing institutional
analysis framework could be adapted for assessing the
suitability of introducing PPPs in water utilities.
1. INTRODUCTION
The world is entering a historical urban transition: for the very
first time in history, the global urban population will exceed the
rural population during the year 2007.1 UN-HABITAT estimates
that 95% of the world’s urban growth in the next two decades will
occur in the cities of developing countries, most of which will be
absorbed by small cities and towns with populations of less than
1 million.1 Yet, since the mid-1980s, the quality of municipal
social services such as water, sanitation, health and education has
been declining.2 For instance, WHO/UNICEF estimated that the
number of urban residents in the developing regions without
access to safe water increased from103$5 million in 1990 to 157$7
million in 2002, while for sanitation, the number increased from
459$1 million to 555$4 million in the same period.3 Subsequently,
water professionals and policy makers have had to rethink how
the efficiency and effectiveness of service provision could be
improved in order to match the increasing urbanisation
challenges. One of the options considered since the late 1980s is
the role of the private sector in infrastructure development and
service provision in the water sector.
The scope of private sector participation ranges from full
privatisation—that is, complete transfer of assets and
responsibility to the private sector—to public–private
partnerships (PPPs) in which the assets remain with in the
public sector, but government and the private sector
collaborate to provide the services.4–6 Several modes of PPPs
in water services management are to be found across the
globe, under the following most common contractual
arrangements.4,7,8
(a) Service contracts. Private operators provide limited
specialist activities for 1-2 years.
(b) Management contracts. Private operators take over the
operation and maintenance of part or all the system for
about 2-5 years.
(c) Lease contracts. Private operators take over operation and
maintenance of the infrastructure for about 5-10 years,
collect revenue and pay lease fees to the public utilities.
(d ) Concession Contracts. Longer-term rights (for 20-30 years)
for the use of all assets are conferred on private operators,
who invest in infrastructure development, and recover the
costs through tariffs.
The global number of PPP projects in the urban
water/sewerage subsector reaching financial closure increased
more than tenfold between 1990 and 1997, reaching a
cumulative capital expenditure of US$25 billion in 1997.6
Latin American and Caribbean countries topped the list of
beneficiary regions, with a share of 42% of the projects, which
were valued at 48% of the total investment.9 In some
developing countries, PPPs have been successfully applied to
introduce private sector incentives and commercial
management skills, which have precipitated into positive
changes in management of public water services in developing
countries.4,7,8 PPPs may provide the following benefits to
provision of water and sanitation services.8
(a) The private sector can bring better management and
technical skills to the public sector, which would lead to
higher cost-effectiveness and operational efficiency.
(b) The private sector may more easily access funds from
banking institutions to fill the financial gap for
investment financing.
(c) The partnerships may enable government departments to
move out of management of service delivery and
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concentrate on the role of enabling environment and
regulation.
(d ) The private sector is more flexible and has better capacity
to respond quickly to the changing external environment,
leading to better service delivery.
(e) The private sector has a high level of customer focus, and
higher capacity to provide customer satisfaction.
( f ) The private sector may have a higher propensity to develop the
skills of the staff and give them better remuneration packages
with built-in output-based incentives.
PPPs are not, however, a panacea for bailing out poorly-managed
water utilities operating in unsustainable institutional
environments where consumers are not required to pay realistic
tariffs. There are two main requirements that need to be fulfilled
for benefits to be realised from PPPs.4
(a) The type of PPP adopted should be carefully selected to
match the operating environment.
(b) The government should provide an enabling environment
and put in place effective regulatory systems and mechanisms
that enable the private operators to perform effectively and
efficiently, but also check their excesses, if any.
These two requirements may not have been carefully considered for
many PPPs that were initiated in the mid-1990s, a situation which
may have resulted in a subsequent sharp decline of private sector
investment inflows and reduced scope of the PPPs’ taxonomy, as
well as the fewer number of countries taking on the partnerships.9
According to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
project database maintained by the World Bank, the private
sector investment commitment in water/sewerage projects in
developing countries dropped from a record high of US$8 billion
in 1997 to less than US$2 billion in 2003, but recovered by 36%
in 2004.9 However, 90% of the PPP investment activities in 2004
took place in three countries—Chile, China and Mexico—and most
of these activities focused on construction of water/sewerage
treatment plants, in the form of smaller projects.9 Not only has
the scope, level and geographical spread of PPPs in the water/
sanitation sector reduced, but some water infrastructure PPP
projects have suffered contract disputes. Whereas many contracts
were renegotiated, 20 projects were cancelled or became
distressed in 1990–2004, accounting for 37% of the investment
commitments during the same period.9
Further analysis shows that 80% of the PPP contracts that
attracted disputes or were cancelled were in sub-Saharan
Africa.10 One of the major reasons advanced for this dismal
failure in Africa is the unwillingness of the private operators to
inject investment funds into distribution extensions to the
massive numbers of unconnected households.10 Experience in
the past decade has shown that there are risks for involving the
private sector (whose primary objective is profit making) in water
service provision. These risks can be managed by developing
appropriate forms of PPPs, ensuring competitive bidding, and
developing effective poverty-aware regulatory and contract
monitoring systems.4 This paper reports on a case study
conducted in the coastal town of Longgang, in China in which an
institutional analysis was conducted to assess the need for, and
suitability of, introducing PPPs in the provision of urban water
and sewerage services.
2. THE GROWTH OF PPPS IN THE CHINESE URBAN
WATER SECTOR
The private sector in China has been growing since economic
reforms were launched in the late 1970s, but private sector
participation in public utility services could be traced from the
early 1980s.5 Several factors have led to a massive demand for new
infrastructure and improved service levels in the water/sanitation
sector. A key factor is the increasing demand for freshwater supply
for domestic and industrial consumption in China, which is
predicated to rise by 60% over 50 years, up to 800 billion cubic
metres per year.5 Other significant factors are the demand for
increased service levels accompanying China’s high economic
growth rates, and the country’s attraction of world events such as
the 2008 Olympic games.11 The Chinese government has
recognised the limitations of the public sector to cope with the
increasing service gap. As a result, the government has not only
strived to create an enabling environment for the local and
international private sector, but has gone further to invite trans-
national corporations (TNCs) to contribute to improvement of
water supply and sewage treatment services in China.5
In response to the opening up of business opportunities in the
Chinese public water sector, water TNCs such as Vivendi, Suez,
Thames Water and Anglian Water have, since the 1980s
scrambled to bid for various projects in China, although
significant engagement started in the early 1990s.5 At the
beginning, the most common strategy used by the TNCs to
successfully penetrate the Chinese market was to set up joint
ventures with Chinese private enterprises. Thereafter, the TNCs
organised a series of international conferences and workshops,
through which they gained more insight into the Chinese
political, economic and socio-cultural environment.12 Most local
private enterprises engaged in the Chinese water sector
participate in the management of the water supply and sewerage
services as subcontractors for water TNCs. Of late, some of these
local firms have emerged as principal contractors, as exemplified
by the Youlian Consortium’s success in winning the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract in 2002 for construction of
Shanghai’s No. 1 Sewage Treatment Plant.5
Apart from joint ventures between Chinese private/public
enterprises and TNCs, private sector participation is being
extended to other modes of PPPs as the Chinese Government
removes more legal, administrative and tariff-setting restrictions
on foreign involvement in public service delivery.5 BOT contracts
have become a popular option of PPPs in China, mainly because
investment risks can be transferred to the private sector and
public debt can be reduced.13 According to the PPI database,
China accounted for 40% of total investment flow to treatment
plants (which was half of the 46 treatment plants built) during the
period 2001-2004.9 Although the number of water and
wastewater infrastructure projects financed through PPPs had
risen to over 130 in 2004 with an investment commitment of over
US$4$8 billion, PPPs still accounted for less than 2% of total
investments in the water sector at the end of the same year.14
One of the reasons for a slow uptake of PPPs by the Chinese
public sector is the time lag between changed policy objectives
and societal acceptability. Generally, Chinese society still
considers provision of water/sanitation services a responsibility
of the government.5 The inflated role of government in provision
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of social services during the communist era consolidated the
state–society relationship, and discouraged the involvement and
growth of the private sector. As a result, despite the gradual shift
of government policy towards private sector participation in the
provision of water and sanitation services in China, many
sections of society, including some technocrats, have been slow
to embrace the PPPs.5 The next section provides background
information on Longgang, a town in the Zhejiang Province,
where the case study was carried out.
3. THE STUDY SETTING
The town of Longgang is the economic nerve-centre of Changnan
County of Wenzhou City, which is located in Zhejiang Province, in
south–eastern China. Following its establishment as an urban
authority in 1984, Longgang has expanded in area to 80$7 km2 and
its population has increased from 6000 to the present estimated
235 000 people, and is administratively composed of nine
districts.15,16 Since its establishment, Longgang has been one of the
forerunners inChina for carryingout several economic reforms that
have led to the smooth urbanisation process of villages, acceptable
to the residents, to the extent that it has been labelled ‘China’s first
peasant city’.15 In recognition of this successful programme,
Longgang has been classified by the United Nations as a town for
piloting sustainable urban development.15,16
Water supply services to the town of Longgang are provided by the
Longgang Water Authority (LWA), which is a semi-autonomous
water utility wholly owned by the Longgang Local Council
Authority. LWA was established by the Peoples’ Government of
Longgang as a semi-autonomous organisation. The bylaws under
which it operates are enacted by thePeoples’ Congress of Longgang.
The operations of the utility are governed by the national legal
framework that includes the 1988 Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC)
Water Law and the 1984 PRC Pollution Prevention Law, which were
amended in 2002 and 1996 respectively.5,13 Further information on
the legislative framework has been included in section 6.
The water utility, headed by a general manager, employs 105 staff
to produce an average of about 50 000 m3 per day. Water is
drawn from Wu Jiayuan reservoir, and is treated through a
conventional water treatment plant comprising processes of pH
adjustment, coagulation and flocculation, sedimentation, slow-
sand filtration and chlorination. Although the utility recovers all
its operation and maintenance costs, it relies on government
subvention for all its capital investment requirements. Staff to the
utility are seconded from other public service departments, and
the management does not have the autonomy to hire or fire its
rank and file. Fig. 1 shows how the utility service departments
were clustered as of July 2005.
4. STUDY OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY
This paper is based on a study conducted for partial fulfilment of
a Masters degree, which sought to address the following main
research questions.16
(a) Is there a need for introduction of PPPs in provision of urban
water services in Longgang?
(b) How conducive is the operating environment for the
introduction of PPPs?
An institutional analysis was conducted to explore these research
questions. Professor Grigg of Colorado State University has
suggested a framework for institutional analysis of public
infrastructure, which comprises a systematic way of critically
studying constituent elements of the institution.17 One way of
conducting this analysis is to ask questions in each category of
institutional elements such as the following.17
(a) What are the laws and controls—that is, legal framework and
control mechanisms?
(b) Who has the control—that is, designated authorities and
stakeholder organisations?
(c) What are the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholder
organisations?
(d ) What are the incentives and disincentives for performance?
(e) What is the existing management culture?
Grigg’s institutional analysis framework briefly described above
was adapted to carry out an assessment of Longgang Water
Authority. Data for the analysis were collected using the
following methods
(a) review of policy documents
(b) observations
(c) survey questionnaires sent to staff members
(d ) focus group discussions with a few staff members and
(e) key informant interviews with utility managers and local
authority leaders. The principal researcher spent two months
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Fig. 1. Longgang water utility organisational structure18
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in mid-2005 working with the water utility to collect data
required for the analyses. The collected data were used to
analyse the internal environment of Longgang Water
Authority, as well as the macro environment in which the
utility operates. The findings are presented in the following
sections.
5. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
5.1. Objectively-verifiable performance indicators
The authors analysed the objectively-verifiable performance
indicators of LWA so as to assess whether there is justification for
introduction of PPPs. Table 1 shows key operational performance
indicators as extracted from the utility’s 2004 annual report. The
data show that Longgang Water Authority (LWA) fulfils its
mandate and provides services to all consumers residing in its
area of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the water services are provided
to the customers on a 24/7 basis, fully continuous, and therefore
highly reliable. However, no customer surveys had been carried
out in recent times, to provide information on other aspects of
service quality such as functional quality (i.e. how a service
provider’s contact staff relate to customers) and corporate image
(i.e. the overall image formed by customers about a service
provider), which have been found to make a very highly
significant contribution to customer satisfaction and subsequent
loyalty to the service provider.19
Operational data also indicate that all water supply connections are
fitted with service meters, which enable the service provider to bill
according to volumetric rates, and foster the customers’ willingness
to pay for the services. Unaccounted-for water (UFW) is one of the
performance indicators that are used to compare overall cost-
effectiveness among urban water utilities. UFW is the ratio of water
not sold to total water produced, which is computed as 16% for
LWA. This figure falls in the range that is acceptable for water
utilities in low-income countries operating distribution systems
that are relatively old (over 30 years).20 However, in view of the
high technological level of the Chinese economy, the small size of
the distribution network, and the relatively new distribution
network in Longgang (a maximum of about 20 years of age), the
guidelines produced by the Department of Construction require
Longgang to have not more than 12% of UFW.21
Another indicator that is important for measuring operational
efficiency is the number of employees per 1000 connections, which
for Longgang was computed as 2$8. This level of productivity is
considered efficient in the region, and compares favourably with
the ratioof3$6 forBangkok (Thailand), a citywithhigher economies
of scale: Bangkok had1$44 million service connections in 2001
compared with 37 542 for Longgang in 2004.16,22
To assess the in-depth performance and get a feel of the long-
term sustainability of an organisation, it is not sufficient merely
to read key financial statements such as the balance sheet and
income statement: it is useful to evaluate the trend of key
financial performance indicators over a considerable period of
time. Table 2 shows five key financial indicators of Longgang
Water Utility for the period 2000–2004.
The return on fixed assets (ROFA) is a ratio that is considered by
financial analysts to be a primary measure of profitability, which
is in turn important for an organisation’s survival and
sustainability.23 For public urban water utilities, it is
recommended that ROFA ranges between 0$06 and 0$08 to enable
replacement and renewal of plant and equipment during the
infrastructure life cycle.20 The ROFA figures for LWA are
considered to be on the low side, and may not foster
sustainability of services. The current ratio is a measure of
whether sufficient liquid resources are available to meet
maturing obligations, which for a water utility are usually in the
form of purchase of chemicals, payment of utility services such as
electricity and telephone bills. The current ratio for LWA
improved from 1$34 in 2001 to 2$80 in 2004, the later figure
being appropriate for a public water utility.20
The operating ratio improved from close to 1 in the first four
years to 0$577 in 2004. This is a good trend—an operating ratio
Operational indicator Definition Value
Target population Total population in designated service area 235 952
Daily water production Cubic metres of water produced per day 50 000
Number of connections No. of active customers’ connections drawing water from the distribution
network
37 542
Service coverage Ratio of population served to total population 100%
Continuity of supply Average No. of hours supply is available to consumers per day 24 h
Metered connection Ratio of No. of connections fitted with meters to total number of connections 100%
Unaccounted-for water Fraction of water produced, but NOT sold (i.e. not billed) 16%
Employees per 1000 connection Average No. of employees serving every 1000 connections 2$8
Table 1. Key operational performance indicators for Longgang Water Utility in 200418
Ratio Definition 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Return on fixed assets Ratio of profit before interest and tax to net fixed assets 0 0$013 0$08 0$013 0$019
Current ratio Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 4$30 1$34 1$74 1$72 2$80
Operating ratio Ratio of operating expenses to operating revenue 0$999 0$939 0$966 0$948 0$577
Bill collection efficiency Percentage of bills collected 0$98 0$99 0$99 0$99 0$99
Domestic and industrial
tariff
US$ per cubic metre (US$ 1Z8$2 yuan) 0$28 0$28 0$30 0$30 0$30
Table 2. Key financial ratios for Longgang water utility during the period 1999-200418
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that is close to unity is not desirable as it points to an inefficient
use of resources to provide services. It is recommended that the
operating ratio for a public water utility should be below 60%.20
The bill collection efficiency is very good, close to 100%.
However, the high efficiency may be a reflection of a low tariff for
consumers with a high ability to pay for services, which is a small
fraction of tariffs charged by water utilities in some less
developed countries. The objective of the current tariff is partial
cost recovery: whereas it is intended to cover operation and
maintenance costs computed on historical costs, it does not cater
for replacement costs, and may not even cover the marginal costs
of production. Such tariff levels do not foster financial, let alone
economic or environmental sustainability.
Although the technical performance indicators are generally
good, some of the financial indicators are below average, a
situation which does not promote economic and environmental
sustainability. Some of these performance indicators are typical
of a water utility that engenders a public goods model, in which
supply-driven services are delivered at highly subsidised costs.4
Introduction of a suitable PPP would give the service provider the
necessary autonomy to make operational decisions, and provide
a strong incentive for increased performance.24
5.2. Subjective performance assessments
Objectively verifiable performance indicators are an important
ingredient but are not in themselves sufficient for institutional
analysis. Subjective performance evaluations have been found
to add value to overall performance assessment,25 as subjective
assessments are capable of analysing ‘software’ aspects of an
organisation which may not be measured from objectively
verifiable numerical indicators. Subjective performance
assessments should cover aspects such as human resource
management, employees’ attitudes towards the organisation,
teamwork, inter-group relations, and attitude towards
change.17,26 This study adapted a measurement instrument
designed and widely tested by the Water and Sanitation for
Health (WASH) Project as a guideline for institutional
assessment of water utilities.27
The WASH guidelines provide a number of performance
indicators in the form of statements, contributing to each of the
multi-scale performance themes shown in first column of
Table 3. Statements listed under each performance theme elicit
the respondent’s perceptions of organisational performance in
individual aspects, which contribute to that specific theme, as
described in the second column of Table 3. Based on the data
collected, the principal researcher classified each of the indicator
statements as very high (5); high (4); medium (3) or low (2), or
very low (1). The mean scores for performance themes were
worked out, which are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.
The subjective performance assessments displayed in Table 3
point to low ratings for most performance themes. The
organisational autonomy is mainly undermined by the lack of
flexibility on tariff setting/adjustment; and inadequate
authority/control over utility staff. Leadership is ranked low
mainly because many of the staff interviewed did not display
adequate understanding of the utility’s mission, and there was
hardly any downward delegation of responsibilities. Although
the commercial orientation is ranked as high, the customer
orientation is perceived to be low, mainly because the views of
the government officials are valued higher than those of
customers in the strategic direction of the utility.
The technical capacity of the staff does not match the highly
sophisticated plant and equipment installed. Whenever there is
need to make highly demanding technical decisions, consultants
are outsourced. This scenario is partly because the utility has not
attracted highly skilled staff, nor has it invested in the skills
development of staff. The organisational culture is ranked as very
low mainly because staff do not portray any sense of ownership
of the organisation, but focus on individual rather than team
achievements.
Performance theme Definition Number of indicators Mean score
Organisational
autonomy
The organisation’s degree of independence from the national
government or other government bodies in making vital decisions
affecting organisational goals such as tariffs, budgets, personnel etc.
10 2$4 (Low)
Leadership Ability to inspire others to understand the organisation’s mission, to
commit themselves towards that mission, and to work towards its
fulfilment
14 (2$4) Low
Management and
administration
The capacity to organise people and other resources to accomplish
the work of the organisation
14 (3$4) Medium
Commercial
orientation
The degree to which actions in an organisation are driven by
cost-effectiveness and operating efficiency
8 (3$8) High
Customer orientation Organising and directing the resources and services of an
organisation towards total satisfaction of its customers
7 (2$3) Low
Technical capacity The level of the organisation’s capacity to carry out the technical
functions required to fulfil the organisational mandate
10 (2$1) Low
Development and
maintaining staff
Activities directed at recruiting staff, providing skills to do the jobs
required and grow professionally, and providing adequate
remuneration and job satisfaction to retain competent staff
10 (3$2) Medium
Organisational culture A set of values and norms that inform and guide everyday actions in
an organisation
7 (1$4) Very low
Interactions with key
external stakeholders
The organisation’s capacity to influence positively and strategically
those institutions that influence its financial, political and legal ability
to work towards its mission
5 (2$6) Medium
Table 3. Results of the subjective performance assessment16,27
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The low scores on the subjective performance assessments point
to an internal organisational environment that is weak and
vulnerable, should there be instability and uncertainty in the
operating environment. It is anticipated that an appropriate mode
of PPP could trigger change and transform an organisation to
being customer- and business-oriented.
6. THE MACRO ENVIRONMENT
The authors assessed the organisation’s external environment
using the framework which examines political, economic, socio-
cultural, and technological factors (PEST analysis) that impact on
utility. Over the years the Chinese Government has enacted laws
and regulations that paved a way for adopting PPPs in the
provision of public services. Typical examples of these laws are5,13
(a) the 1995 PRC Security law
(b) the 1999 PRC Contract law
(c) the 1995 Government build-operate-transfer (BOT) Circular
that provides guidelines on the examination, approval and
administration of experimental foreign-invested concession
projects
(d ) the 1997 Interim Procedures on the administration of projects
conducted outside China
(e) the 1998 government procedures on administration of
borrowing international credit loans.
To assess the institutional profile in which LWA performs, the
authors carried out an activity/responsibility analysis of key
functions of water service provision in Longgang. Fig. 2 shows a
matrix of the allocation of the key roles and responsibilities. The
matrix shows that the two main departments overseeing the
management of water services in the area are Longgang Local
Authority and Department of Construction. While the Department
of Construction is responsible for performance monitoring and
legislation, Longgang Local Authority provides funds for capital
investment and is responsible for human resource management.
Since the Chinese government departments are characterised by a
high level of bureaucratic hierarchies,5 such an arrangement may
not facilitate a strong linkage between investment planning and
the performance monitoring function, which is vital for
promotion of accountability.
The staff remuneration policy overseen by Longgang Local
Authority may not provide a conducive environment for
managers of the LWA to supervise their staff effectively.
Furthermore, full participation by customers is reportedly limited
to payment of tariffs, which does not give them adequate control
over important functions such as tariff setting, utility
performance monitoring and project planning. On the other
hand, the final decision on tariff setting and adjustment lies with
the Price Control Board. The Price Control Board acts as the
economic regulator, and convenes annual review meetings
attended by the officials from the utility and the Department of
Construction, in which utility officials present justification for
increase of tariff. For water quality regulation, the Department of
Health is required to ensure that the utility supplies water
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Fig. 2. Activity/responsibility matrix for provision of services to Longgang16
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conforming to minimum drinking water quality standards as
specified in the water quality standards set by the Department of
Construction.28 However, the Department of Health does not
have adequately trained staff to carry out water quality
monitoring, and heavily relies on the utility’s duty of care
specified in the water quality guidelines to carry out internal
monitoring and assessment.15
Economically, Longgang is one of the fastest growing towns in
China, which, in 2004, realised a gross domestic product (GDP) of
5$27 billion Yuan.18 Like other cities, Longgang has benefited
from the reform process initiated by the Chinese Government on
the following major fronts29
(a) changing from communal land ownership to assigning land
to individual households
(b) attracting the private sector to invest in the industrial sector
(c) the open door policy that attracts foreign investment into
the economy
(d ) establishment of the macro-control mechanism to exercise
monetary and fiscal policies as opposed to central planning
(e) encouragement of the development of non-state sectors of
the economy
( f ) reform of the legal and educational systems to match the
economic reforms.
Since Longgang is a modern town, established in 1984 in the
post-reform era, the leaders of the local authority have been
more responsive to the reforms than their counterparts in
older urban establishments. As a result, a large proportion of
Longgang’s economy is driven by private enterprises, leading
to a higher GDP growth rate of about 19% per year for
Longgang town, compared to the 2005 national annual rate
of about 10%.15,16 Longgang’s economy is comprised of the
industrial sector (67%), services (30%) and agriculture (3%).18
International investment inflows have been encouraged by a
stable exchange rate of the Yuan against international
currency such as the US dollar and the pound sterling,
which has remained stable since the end of the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis.16
Most of the residents of Longgang are employed in the
flourishing industrial and services sector, with a negligible level
of unemployment. The landline telephone coverage is 100%, with
a mobile telephone and internet coverage of 23$8% and 9%,
respectively. Furthermore, the technology used in the water
production and distribution processes is advanced, in which
modern machines and equipment are utilised, and are controlled
by telemetric systems. Perhaps the shortcoming is the inadequate
number of highly skilled staff to operate these systems.
Nonetheless, Longgang Town has achieved the nine-year
universal basic education, with 88% of the residents having
completed junior secondary education.18
Most elements of the external environment presented above
positively contribute to an enabling environment for introducing
PPPs.8 These include China’s economic stability, well-developed
infrastructure, clear economic policies and effective legal
mechanisms aimed at attracting the private sector as a partner to
public service provision, and the consumers’ high ability and
willingness to pay for water services. However, there is need to
clarify roles and responsibilities overseeing service provision at
the sector policy level, and strengthen the regulatory
mechanisms.
7. SWOT ANALYSIS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INTRODUCING PPPs
A SWOT (strengths–weaknesses–opportunities–threats) analysis
was conducted to sum up the findings of the institutional
assessment of Longgang Water Utility. A SWOT analysis is a
simple framework for generating strategic alternatives from a
situational analysis. The SWOT analysis classifies key internal
aspects of an organisation as strengths or weaknesses and the
external situational factors as opportunities or threats. By
classifying and analysing these factors, an organisation can
better leverage its strengths, correct its weaknesses, capitalise on
the opportunities, and deter potentially devastating threats.30
Table 4 shows the SWOT profile of Longgang Water Utility, as
perceived by the researchers.
Strengths Weaknesses
Dedicated, efficient staff Few skilled staff
Modern plant and equipment Tariffs do not cover capital replacement costs
100% service coverage Poor customer orientation of staff
24/7 reliability of water services Low technical capacity
High collection efficiency Poor management information system
A high level of probity Low level of team spirit among staff
High level of commercial orientation of staff Low willingness to change among staff
Utility management well linked up with key policy makers Poor staff remuneration
Low consideration for environmental sustainability
Opportunities Threats
National economic reform process to embrace commercialisation Low organisational autonomy with respect to
High national economic growth rates —Setting/adjusting tariffs
Customers with a high ability to pay for services —Staff remuneration and control
Customers’ high willingness to pay for services Inadequate regulatory mechanisms
Adequate raw water resources High environmental standards required
Investment funds from the central government
A well-informed clientele
Table 4. A SWOT analysis as perceived by the researchers
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The SWOT profile shows that the strengths of LWA are a
dedicated, efficient, accountable workforce that produces a
service with a high technical quality. Since the primary business
objective of private entrepreneurs is to make a profit, such
good technical indicators are attractive for public–private
partnerships. However, staff skills need to be improved in order to
match the modern plant and equipment. The tariff is considerably
low, and cannot even cover staff emoluments that adequately
motivate the workforce. The utility benefits from massive
subsidies in the form of investment funds: the resultant low tariff
does not send the right signals to the consumers about the full
costs of providing water services, and therefore does not promote
the principle of water being considered as an economic good.
Additionally, such low tariffs do not support the polluter-pays
principle, which advocates that whoever causes any
environmental pollution should be responsible for repairing the
damage to the environment.31 Furthermore, utility staff need to
abandon the supply-driven orientation that is characteristic of
many civil servants, to become customer-focused. This
transformation may be accomplished through improvement of
staff conditions of service and training. Changes enumerated
above could easily be introduced through partnership with the
private sector, which is more commercial oriented and better
placed to escape political interference, and use techniques of
new managerialism.4
The SWOT analysis also shows that the external environment in
which LWA operates may be conducive for introduction of
PPPs.10 Not only is China the fastest growing economy in the
world but the national government has carried out various
economic and legislative reforms aimed at attracting private
investment to the public sector. The consumers are not only well
informed, but have a high ability and willingness to pay for water
services. It is envisaged that the introduction of PPPs could
reduce the threats faced by the utility. A partnership with the
private sector could increase the utility’s organisational
autonomy, adopt realistic tariffs, which would promote economic
and environmental sustainability, and require the government to
strengthen regulatory mechanisms and systems. Such changes
would bring benefit to staff (through improved working
conditions), customers (through higher service quality), the
government (through higher economic returns) and the
environment. Such benefits can only be realised if the right type
of PPP is carefully matched with the existing business
environment in Longgang.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has adapted Professor Grigg’s institutional analysis
framework to assess the suitability of introducing PPPs to
Longgang City in China. This framework comprises ‘. a
systematic and repeatable way to break elements apart so that
they can be studied’.19 In this study, the following systematic
steps were taken.
(a) Analysis of the internal environment, which assessed
objectively-verifiable performance indicators, as well as
subjective performance indicators.
(b) Analysis of the macro-environment that looked at the socio-
cultural, technological, economic and political factors that
impact on introduction and performance of PPPs.
A SWOT analysis was then conducted to summarise and discuss
the findings. This paper has provided an example on how to
conduct an institutional analysis for assessing the suitability of
introducing PPPs for improved service delivery.
Not withstanding the limited scope of the study, the two-months’
fieldwork enabled the authors to carry out an institutional analysis
which shows that consideration of common operational
performance indicators classifies Longgang Water Authority
(LWA) as a highly performing water utility. However, deeper
analysis of the internal environment shows that the high level of
service is being propped up by a heavy dose of subsidies from the
central government, a situation which is neither economically nor
environmentally sustainable, especially given the escalating high
demand of water resources in China. The main deficiencies that
could be addressed by introduction of an appropriate form of PPPs
are (a) the low level of autonomy for LWA; (b) the low level of
customer orientation; (c) low staff remuneration and inadequate
skills in the organisation; and (d) low tariff levels. Addressing
these aspects would increase the economic and environmental
sustainability and bring the mission of the utility in line with the
policy objectives of Longgang and the central government.
The external environmental scan shows that conditions in the
macro-environment are largely conducive to the implementation
of PPPs. The involvement of the private sector could contribute to
improving the financial sustainability, produce more business-
oriented strategic investment decisions, and trigger changes in
the external environment that will strengthen policy making and
implementation.25 However, there is a need to carry out a deeper
analysis to identify issues of prime importance to Longgang
Municipality in relation to planning for the introduction of PPPs,
and identify the form of PPP that could add value by providing
the right incentives to improve the economic and environmental
sustainability.
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